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THE ROLE OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN
ACT IN INTERNATIONAL PATENT
FRAUD: "WALK SOFTLY AND
CARRY A BIG STICK"
DAVID STEINBERG*
Legal recognition of the propriety of permitting patent monopolies in
the United States is embodied in the Constitution.' Historically, the
first congressional act to allow patent monopolies preceded the Sher-
man Act2 by nearly one hundred years.' The individual inventor
generally seeks protection under the federal patent system to guard in-
ventions or improvements to existing products from commercial ex-
ploitation by competitors.4 Corporations often acquire patent rights
from their employees or from other individuals because corporations
cannot apply for patents under the patent laws.5 Although American
* B.A., 1977, University of Michigan; J.D., 1980, University of Detroit; L.LM. candidate,
1981, International Trade Regulation, Georgetown University Law Center, Member, Michigan
Bar.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 states: "The Congress shall have the power. . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .
2. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1890).
3. The Patent Act of 1790 was enacted during the second session of the First Congress. The
Act created an agency in the Department of State headed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Department of War and the Attorney General, only two of whom could issue a patent for a
period not exceeding fourteen years to a petitioner whose invention or discovery was sufficiently
useful and previously unknown. For a more thorough tour through early American patent law,
see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1966). The present Patent Act is codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) states:
Contents and term of patent
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States, referring to the
specification for the particulars thereof.
5. The wording of the patent statute requires that the patent application be in the name of
the human inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1976). Corporations are not natural persons, which is
what the statute requires the applicant to be. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1976), which states that "Appli-
cation for patent shall be made by the inventor . . ." (emphasis added), and section 115 which
states in part that "The applicant shall make oath that he believes himself to be the original and
first inventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement
thereof, for which he solicits a patent; and shall state of what country he is a citizen. ... 35
Washington University Open Scholarship
124 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:123
law vigorously fosters and protects property rights in inventions,6 the
scope of those rights is often disputed.7
The purpose of a limited monopoly grant is to provide an incentive
for private enterprise to devote resources to innovative research, to ex-
pend investments to place new inventions into practice, and to expose
the benefits of the inventions to a wider audience.' Courts have real-
ized that corporations may use power derived from a patent grant to
restrain free trade in violation of the antitrust laws of the United
States. 9 The United States antitrust laws favor competition in open
markets and condemn acts that either encourage or promote monopoli-
zation. 10 The antitrust laws are the foundation of a broad, national
two-pronged commitment to competition. The consumer should be
able to purchase goods at a price that an efficient business can justify
and business enterprises should compete solely on the basis of their
own merit in the marketplace.
The antitrust laws dictate that patent monopolies are only limited
monopolies, which may not be indirectly broadened or unfairly ex-
U.S.C. § 115 (1976). The language appears to contemplate that a natural person will be both
inventor and applicant. Under 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976), a patent holder may assign or sell any or
all of his rights. The statute states "[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property." Id.
6. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26-32 (1912); Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423-26 (1908); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70,
91(1902).
7. See Adelman, Properly Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrusl: The Role of Compulsory Li.
censing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 978 n.3 (1977).
8. See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS 1 403 (2d ed. 1974); Turner, The Patent Systemr
and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 450, 451-54 (1969).
9. See Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 144-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 941 (1976). But cf. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co.,
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies).
10. Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976) provide:
§ 1 Trust, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpo-
ration, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 2 Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if
a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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ploited, and that assignments of patent rights are valid, contractual
transactions only if they do not offend the prohibitions of the antitrust
laws." The Supreme Court has held that enforcing or attempting to
enforce a fraudulently obtained patent may be unlawful monopoliza-
tion or attempted monopolization if the necessary elements of the Sher-
man Act offenses are present.'
2
Legal problems facing licensors and patentees are becoming increas-
ingly complex in the international sphere.1 3 The licensor and licensee
are not only confronted with the necessity of complying with the varied
patent laws peculiar to each country, but also with the impact of their
operations on the United States antitrust laws.
Recently, in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. , the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that federal courts have jurisdiction to
resolve antitrust claims stemming from fraud in the procurement of
patents abroad, thus warning that American courts will scrutinize care-
fully conduct abroad for anticompetitiveness. This Article analyzes the
monopolistic implications of Mannington Mills and considers the point
at which international patent fraud may be determined unlawful mo-
nopolization or an unlawful attempt to monopolize.
11. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
12. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In
answer to a suit by Food Machinery for patent infringement, Walker charged that Food Machin-
ery and Chemical (FMC) had fraudulently obtained the patent by swearing before the patent
office that it neither knew nor believed that its invention had been in public use in the United
States for more than one year prior to filing its patent application. Walker charged that FMC had
violated the antitrust laws by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining the patent,
and sought treble damages. The district court dismissed FMC's infringement complaint and
Walker's counterclaim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, held
that enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the patent office may violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act provided all other elements necessary to this type of a case are present. The Court
remanded for trial on the issue of definition of relevant market and measurement of FMC's ability
to lessen competition within that market.
13. The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Antitrust Guidefor Interna-
tional Operations, released in 1977 [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Guide], was intended to aid inter-
national business decisionmakers, lawyers, and others concerned with antitrust enforcement in the
international sector in making decisions that may result in enforcement of the antitrust laws. This
policy oriented guide has been heavily discussed and criticized. See Fugate, Department of Jus-
tice ':Antitrust Guidefor International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977); Griffin,.4 Critique
ofthe Justice Department'sAntitrust Guidefor International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215
(1978); Stern, International Licensing and the New Antitrust Guidefor International Operations, 7
ALPA Q.J. 37 (1979).
14. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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I. THE PATENT
Patent terms must be properly defined to resolve the impact of sec-
tion 2 on international patent fraud. The importance can be seen from
the confusion that has existed in several courts. 5 An inventor is a per-
son or a group of persons who solely or jointly discovers or invents a
new and useful machine, process, article of manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter. 6 The Patent Act enunciates the conditions of patenta-
bility. The prerequisites indicate that patentability is dependent on
three explicit conditions--"novelty and utility" as articulated and de-
fined in sections 10117 and 10218 of the Patent Act, and the statutory
15. See Weaver Mfg. Co. v. Bear Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1940), in which the
court mistakenly stated that there could be "infringed disclosure." Disclosure cannot be infringed,
only the patent claim may be infringed. See also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research
Corp., 522 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1975) in which the incorrect phrase "infringed upon the...
license" was used. Only a nonlicensee may infringe a patent; a repudiating licensee breaches a
patent.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states:
Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
17. Id.
18. The conditions for patentability are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1976). The condi-
tion of novelty or newness is implied in subsections 102(a), (e), and (g). Circumstances resulting
in the loss of the right to a patent are described in the remaining subsections, 102(b), (c), (d), and
(1). Section 102 states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described
in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an
inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign
country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application
for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the
application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for pat-
ent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of
paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by
the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by
another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of
invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and re-
duction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/8
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formulation of "nonobviousness" in section 103.19 An inventor is al-
ways a natural person or group of natural persons, and not a corpora-
tion.2° Additionally, an inventor has a common-law right to use,
convey, license, or leave his invention dormant.2 '
A patent, a congressionally created right, allows one to exclude
others for a limited period of time from making, using, or selling the
invention.2 Inventors receive statutory protection under an explicit
grant of constitutional power to encourage inventors to disclose their
discoveries to the public because common law granted no comparable
right of exclusion.23
A patent applicant is one who files an application in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. 24 The applicant may be the in-
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
19. The conditions for patentability are expressed as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
20. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
21. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945); Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 403, 429-30 (1908). In Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool &
Mach. Works Chief Justice Taft stated:
[T]he Government did not confer on the patentee the right himself to make, use or vend
his own invention, that such right was a right under the common law not arising under
the federal patent laws and not within the grant of power to Congress to enact such
laws.... [I]n its essence all that the Government conferred by the patent was the right
to exclude others from making, using or vending his invention.
261 U.S. 24, 35 (1923) (emphasis added).
22. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text. The following quote from Bauer & Cie. v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913), succinctly states the basis for codifying a "patent law."
The right to make, use and sell an invented article is not derived from the patent law.
This right existed before and without the passage of the law and was always the right of
an inventor. The act secured to the inventor the exclusive right to make, use and vend
the thing patented, and consequently to prevent others from exercising like privilege
without the consent of the patentee.... It was passed for the purpose of encouraging
useful invention and promoting new and useful improvements by the protection and
stimulation thereby given to inventive genius.... With these beneficient purposes in
view the act of Congress should be fairly or even liberally construed; yet, while this
principle is generally recognized, care should be taken not to extend by judicial construc-
tion the rights and privileges which it was the purpose of Congress to bestow.
Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
24. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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ventor or the personal representative of a deceased or incompetent in-
ventor.25
A patentee is the person who holds title to a patent for a contractu-
ally determined period of time. When the patent on a product or proc-
ess expires, the patentee's right of exclusion expires and the previously
patented invention enters the public domain. A patent has all the at-
tributes of personal property.26 Assignment of a patent is an effective
transfer of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention.
While sections 102 and 103 stress the "new and useful" tests, the piv-
otal section of the Patent Act of 1952 is section 103.27 Section 103 is
cast in relatively unambiguous terms. In addition to novelty and util-
ity, patentability depends on the "nonobvious" nature of the "subject
matter sought to be patented."'28 The language of section 103 is
strongly reminiscent of language in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.29 The
Supreme Court in Hotchkiss gave birth to "invention" as a word of
legal art signifying patentable inventions or innovations. Hotchkiss
distinguished between new and useful innovations, which were capable
of sustaining a patent and those that were not, by positing that a patent-
able invention evidences more ingenuity and skill than the degree pos-
sessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business.30
Section 103 expresses an additional requirement for patentability
originally expressed in Hotchkiss. Both section 103 and Hotchkiss em-
phasize the pertinent art existing at the time the invention was made,
and advances in the field. The major distinction, however, lies in con-
gressional emphasis on "nonobviousness" as the test of section 103,
rather than the less definitive "invention" language of Hotchkiss.3
25. 35 U.S.C. §117 (1976).
26. See W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973).
27. See note 3 supra.
28. See note 19 supra.
29. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
30. The Court stated:
[U]ness more ingenuity and skill . .. were required ... than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other
words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.
Id. at 267.
31. The Senate and House Reports, S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reflect the emphasis in these terms:
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which exists in the law
and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts.
[Vol. 59:123
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Congress apparently intended the last sentence of section 103 ("patent-
ability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made") to abolish the controversial "flash of genius" test used in Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.32 Section 103 both em-
braces Hotchkiss and adds a congressional directive that inquiry into
the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented is a prereq-
uisite to patentability. Therefore, section 103 permits a more practical
test of patentability. Additionally, emphasis on nonobviousness is one
of inquiry, not quality, which satisfies constitutional strictures.
One of the preeminent issues in the patent-antitrust conflict is the
burden of proof required of a patent applicant to show creative process
or novelty of accomplishment to qualify for a patent monopoly. In
Graham v. John Deere Co. 33 Justice Clark berated the patent office for
granting patents too freely. Justice Clark stressed that the constitu-
tional reason for a patent is advancement of useful arts and that Con-
gress could not, under the patent power, grant monopolies except for
discoveries that achieve this end.34 Early in America's history Thomas
Jefferson recognized the danger of patent abuse when he stated that the
line between patentable and nonpatentable should be between "the
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent, and those which are not."'3 5 The standard, however, is difficult
to apply. The patent office, and often the courts, are entrusted with the
difficult task of: (1) Comprehending the existing art relevant to the
claimed invention; (2) understanding the relationship between that art
and the invention; (3) grasping the problems that the invention was
intended to solve; and (4) attaining sufficient familiarity with the level
An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing
has not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the new
thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a pat-
ent....
Section 103 states this requirement in the title. It refers to the difference between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art.... If this difference is such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in
the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the
courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This sec-
tion should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared
in some cases.
S. REP. No. 1979, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 7.
32. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
33. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. Id. at 9.
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of performance of journeymen in the art to decide whether journeymen
addressing the problem could be expected to come up with the claimed
invention as a solution.36
The grant of a patent may conflict with antitrust laws. When patents
are used in attempts to unreasonably restrain free trade in or substan-
tially affect commerce of the United States, courts are faced with the
uneasy task of reconciling patent and antitrust precepts. 37 For exam-
ple, does a firm violate section 2 of the Sherman Act if it grants a patent
license that restricts resale price of the invention or the geographic ter-
ritory in which the invention may be sold or practiced? Is section 2 of
the Sherman Act violated if a firm accumulates sufficient patents to
control a market? The answers to these questions involve compromis-
ing, adjusting, and integrating patent and antitrust laws to fit the facts
and circumstances of each particular situation.38
Conflict between patent and antitrust laws often occurs because mo-
nopoly rights granted to a patentee are greater than those possessed by
an ordinary property owner. These greater rights leave the monopolist
free to charge higher prices for the patented product than would be
charged in its absence. A patent application is an attempt to acquire a
right to engage in monopoly pricing; the ability to raise prices and re-
duce output without the restraints of a freely competitive market. The
ability to engage in monopolistic activity (e.g, pricing, output, control)
appears to violate the Sherman Act. The courts, however, have de-
clared that the purpose of patent law is to administer monopolies.39
36. See W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW ch. 3 (1973).
37. The.Antitrust Guide notes that "Terms of an agreement may be permitted, despite the fact
that they restrict some competition, provided that the restriction is clearly ancillary to some legiti-
mate purpose and is appropriately limited in scope." Antitrust guide, supra note 13, at 3 (emphasis
in original). A third element, reasonableness, is also to be analyzed in determining lawfulness.
Id. at 4.
38. Id. The Antitrust Guide notes that "the antitrust concern is very often not so much with
the particular form of a transaction, but its surrounding circumstances." Id. at 3 (emphasis in
original).
39. In Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 296 (6th
Cir. 1896), the court stated that:
The monopoly in the unpatented staple results as an incident from the monopoly in the
use of complainant's invention, and is therefore a legitimate result of the patentee's con-
trol over the use of his invention by others. Depending, as such a monopoly would, upon
the merits of the invention to which it is a mere incident, it is neither obnoxious to public
policy, nor an illegal restraint of trade.
In Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902), the Court held:
[A]ny conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of
property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufac-
[Vol. 59:123
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The Court in Bement v. National Harrow Co., with full appreciation of
the Sherman Act, concluded that:
The very object of these laws (patent) is monopoly, and the rule is, with
few exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature
illegal. . . , imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for
the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the
Court. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly
or fix prices does not render them illegal.4°
Chief Justice Marshall in 1832 recognized, however, that a monopoly
granted by a patent was not absolute, but was "limited."' 4 1 Regarding
the importance of patent rights, Justice Marshall stated:
The laws which are passed to give effect to this purpose ought, we think,
to be construed in the spirit in which they have been made; and to execute
the contract fairly on the part of the United States, where the full benefit
has been actually received: tf this can be done without transcending the
intention of the statute, or countenancing acts which are fraudulent or may
prove mischievous.42
Thus, "countenancing acts which are fraudulent" was understood over
150 years ago to transcend the intention behind the Sherman Act.43
The policy is still in effect today in the area of patent fraud.'
II. PATENT FRAUD
The patent process requires that an inventor file an application,
which fully specifies and describes the invention sought to be protected
by the patent, with the patent office. A patent examiner decides
whether the technology meets standards of inventiveness, whether it is
new and useful, and whether it is adequately disclosed.45
The promise of monopolistic benefits may tempt an applicant to sup-
press evidence of a prior practice that might have placed the claimed
ture or use or sale of the article, will be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions
in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.
40. 186 U.S. at 91.
41. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832).
42. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. See Mannington Mills, Inc., v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); note 12
supra. In Mannington the court held that fraud in the procurement of patents abroad was an act
or agreement outside the territorial boundaries of the United States which adversely and materi-
ally affected American trade. Therefore, no immunity from the Sherman Act existed for defend-
ant. Id. at 1292, 1295-96, 1300-02.
45. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF ANTITRUST § 179, at 512 (1977).
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invention in the public domain.46 The integrity of the patent system
requires that this type of conduct be examined under the antitrust laws.
Thus a firm may be guilty of monopolization or attempted monopoliza-
tion if it attempted, successfully or unsuccessfully, to acquire a patent
fraudulently.47
Because of these dangers, the Department of Justice believes that two
reasons exist for protecting United States commerce when American
businesses engage in international commerce. First, the Department
must protect the interests of United States consumers by assuring them
the benefits of competitive products and ideas, including those pro-
duced by foreign competitors. The Department has indicated that both
foreign and domestic firms can expect antitrust scrutiny when their
agreements or practices restrain the free flow of United States com-
merce.48 The second antitrust concern of the Department is to protect
foreign investment and export opportunities of American businesses.
Antitrust policy dictates that each American firm engaged in foreign
commerce through investment or exporting be allowed to compete on
its own merits.49
The protectionist policy of the Department of Justice has been de-
rived partially from the patent misuse doctrine. Although the subject
of patent misuse frequently arises as a defense in a patent infringement
action, patent owners may not use their publicly granted monopoly to
46. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965);
United States v. Singer Mfg. Corp., 374 U.S. 174, 176-88 (1963); Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Auto-
motive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 807-14 (1945); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979).
47. See note 46 supra. In two other cases, Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A.
1970), and Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 469 (D. Del.
1966), aj'dinpart, rev'dinpart, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967), the courts
indicated that in an antitrust action based on fraud in obtaining a patent, the plaintiff must estab-
lish that "but for" the fraud no patent would have issued. These courts held that the party attack-
ing validity of the patent must show that false information was given with knowledge of its falsity,
an intent to deceive, materiality of the false statement, and reliance on it by the patent office. See
also Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1971), cert denied,
408 U.S. 929 (1972).
48. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 5. See also Stem, International Licensing and the
New Antitrust Guidefor International Operations, 7 APLA Q.J. 37, 41 (1979).
49. Id. The Antitrust Guide notes that the Department of Justice will continue to be strongly
committed to enforcement of these policies. The large proportion of international business trans-
actions involving American firms, however, will not invoke United States antitrust law enforce-
ment. These transactions usually will not have a "substantial and adverse effect" on United States
commerce sufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" standard for federal jurisdiction. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/8
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violate the antitrust laws.5 0 The Supreme Court enunciated the equita-
ble rule nearly forty years ago: "[Clourts of equity, may appropriately
withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted con-
trary to the public interest.' The patent misuse doctrine is closely
related to the public interest in restraining the patentee from engaging
in anticompetitive arrangements which violate the antitrust laws. 2
The rationale underlying a patentee's liability for antitrust violations
is based on the notion that the patent right is not absolute. The center
of the patent-antitrust controversy is the delineation of this right. Al-
though the patent holder has limited protection from enforcement of
the antitrust laws, the protection is forfeited when the patentee exceeds
the scope of the rights. 3
To resolve this dispute, one must distinguish between those activities
that are a legitimate exercise of patent rights, and those that are not. A
patent is properly exercised under the laws of the United States when
its use "is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant
of the patent is entitled to secure."5" In contrast, the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) determines the propriety of the activity by
determining whether the right asserted is one that goes to the "essence"
or "existence" of the patent or merely to the "exercise" of the industrial
property right.5 These differing interpretations as to the scope of a
patent may result in different results in a patent action depending on
the jurisdiction.
50. Misuse has its roots in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. The leading case in this
area is United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957). For a discussion
of misuse and purge as equitable in nature, see In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation,
472 F. Supp. 170, 171-73 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
51. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). The Supreme Court
later made fraud on the patent office in the procurement of a patent an equitable defense to an
infringement action. See Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945).
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Western U.S. Indus., 608 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979), the court quoted
Precision Instrument's maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands." Id.
at 1217. The court in Grace further noted Precision Instrument's warning that patent monopolies
are "issues of great moment to the public" particularly suited to "the equity court's use of discus-
sion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant." Id.
52. See Wallace, Proper Use of the Patent Misuse Doctrine-.4n Antitrust Defense to Patent
Infringement Actions in Need of Rational Reform, 26 MERCER L. REV. 813, 814 (1974).
53. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND ANTITRUST LAws 190 (1973). See also
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308-11 (1948).
54. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
55. Deutsche Grammophon Geselleschaft MbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmtirkte GmbH & Co.
KG, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631, 647 (1971).
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In a patent fraud case the primary antitrust prohibitions are monop-
olization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize under
section 2 of the Sherman Act,56 and conspiracy to restrain trade under
section 1 of the Act.57 Additionally, the presence of elements of an
antitrust violation that result in patent fraud also may result in a crimi-
nal violation under sections 100158 or 371 of Title 18 of the Federal
Criminal Code.59 Because the gravamen of an antitrust violation is ac-
tual or potential impact on competition, fraudulent procurement in vio-
lation of sections 1001 or 371 is insufficient to establish an antitrust
violation. The patent must be enforced or asserted before the Sherman
Act will apply.60
The patent office must determine, however, if the patentee has vio-
lated the standard of conduct required by the office before liability can
be assessed. The Supreme Court's decisions in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co. ,61 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co. ,62 and Kingsland v. Dorsey6 3 represent an
56. See note 10 supra.
57. Id.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material act, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States.
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
60. In Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.
Del. 1971), the court stated: "It is not the mere obtaining of a fraudulent patent which brings
antitrust liability to its owner, it is the assertion or enforcement of the issued patent acquired by
fraud which creates antitrust liability." Cf. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp. 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) ("the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent
Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act").
The gravamen of a section 2 violation is acquisition of power over price or the power to exclude
competition at will or an attempt or conspiracy to acquire such power. If the acquisition of a
patent by fraud has no economic impact, then the wrongful conduct was not within the scope of
the antitrust laws. Cf. Western Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Griffith Labs., Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 680,
681 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (court held that plaintiff had standing to bring a declaratory judgment action
to seek invalidation of an alleged fraudulently procured patent, but declined, however, to enter-
tain an antitrust suit against the patentee because there was sufficient evidence of a threat to
enforce the patent against plaintiff).
61. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
62. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
63. 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
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attempt to define the patent office's standard for the patent applicant's
conduct. These cases emphasize the social and economic importance of
ensuring that the procurement and enforcement of a patent, a form of
monopoly, is free from the taint of inequitable conduct. Earlier case
law did not address the significance of social and economic repercus-
sions.6" Thus, the Kingsland case, which required attorneys before the
patent office to act with "the highest degree of candor and good
faith, 65 quickly reinforced the "uncompromising duty" standard set
forth in Precision Instrument.66 More recently, a court of appeals has
held that an applicant has a "high duty" to inform the patent office of
all pertinent facts affecting the processing of his application.67 The
duty of complete disclosure to the patent office arises for all relevant
matters even though the applicant feels they do not establish anticipa-
tion. All disclosure must be:
[R]outinely coupled with an explanation as to why it does not constitute
anticipation. The duty of disclosure to the patent office is enhanced by
the consequence that issuance of a patent by the patent office is accorded
a presumption of validity, even though the proceeding before the patent
office is not adversary and is dependent upon examination by an official
who may not equal in resources those who are in the field commercially,
and who does not have the extra spark of an economic incentive to avoid
the tribute or other restraint that may be exacted by a patentee.6"
Thus, a need for the "highest degree of candor and good faith" and
"uncompromising duty" standards is clear. Determination of whether
applicants meet these standards is often difficult. A considerable body
of authority holds that mere negligent omission or misstatement before
the patent office in the absence of a showing of intentional fraud or
willfulness does not amount to "unclean hands," which would bar en-
64. In United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888), the Court focused only
on the propriety of the United States being allowed to cancel or annul a patent for fraud. The
opinion did not outline a policy regarding desirability of keeping patent procurement free from
fraud.
65. 338 U.S. at 319.
66. 324 U.S. at 818.
67. Turzillo v. P&Z Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897
(1976). The court noted that mere failure to cite a reference, without more, is not grounds for
invalidating a patent. Further, in determining "obviousness" under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970), hind-
sight reconstruction of the prior art after the inventions' commercial acceptance is not the applica-
ble standard. 532 F.2d at 1397.
68. 532 F.2d at 1399.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
136 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:123
forcement of an otherwise valid patent.69 There are indications that a
patent applicant may breach an affirmative duty of disclosure by reck-
lessness or gross negligence even though the applicant does not mani-
fest a deliberate intent to deceive the examiner.70
The question of fraud is one of fact to which the "clearly erroneous"
standard of section 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ap-
plies in discerning the degree of guilty conduct before the patent of-
fice.71 An allegation of fraud must be proved by "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence and not by a bare preponderance of the evi-
dence which leaves the issue in doubt."72
The subject of inequitable conduct in the procurement of patents
achieved its present controversial position after the landmark Supreme
Court decision in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
and Chemical Corp ." In Walker the Supreme Court recognized for the
first time that fraudulent procurement and enforcement of a patent
could be the basis of an action for treble damages74 under section 2 of
69. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)
(willful misrepresentation required to strip patentee of its exemption from the antitrust laws);
Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 819 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970) (same);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 371, 394-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (the court
was persuaded that Allied's failure to disclose was not purposeful or designed to mislead nor did it
constitute gross or reckless disregard of its duty of disclosure); Tractor Supply Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 420, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (innocent misrepresentation without
proof of intention or willfulness does not work forfeiture of patentee's rights).
70. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("Where public policy demands
a complete and accurate disclosure it may suffice to show nothing more than the misrepresenta-
tions were made in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their truth."). Cf. Monsanto Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 599-600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972) (failure to
disclose inconsistent representations made in prior applications "amounted to misrepresentation
transgressing equitable standards of conduct owed the public"); Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard
Paper Co., 432 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971) (deliberate
misrepresentation required except possibly when nondisclosed prior art is almost identical with
the patentee's invention); Xerox Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 322 F. Supp. 963, 968-69 (S.D.N Y.
1971) ("recklessness indicating a disregard for [patentee's] duty of frankness" may bar enforce-
ment of patent).
71. Norton Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530 F.2d 435, 444 (1st Cir. 1976). The court held that
the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof was not clearly errone-
ous. The court further ruled that no common-law fraud existed. Id.
72. See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224,251 (1897); Cataphote Corp. v.
DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972).
73. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). For a discussion of Walker, see note 12 supra.
74. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 provides:
Suits by persons injured; amount of recovery
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
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the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to prove the
violation were present."
Walker involved the question of whether the maintenance and en-
forcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the patent office may be the
basis of an antitrust claim in a treble damage action brought under
section 4 of the Clayton Act for violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. The trial court dismissed the infringers' amended counterclaim
for failure to state a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act.76 The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision77 to uphold the
district court's judgment of dismissal. The Court held that obtaining a
patent by "knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent
Office" would be "sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its exemption
from the antitrust laws." The Court emphasized, however, that "Food
Machinery's good faith would furnish a complete defense." The Court
said good faith "includes an honest mistake. . . [or] so-called 'techni-
cal fraud.' "78
Walker's claim rested on a concept of per se illegality under section 2
of the Sherman Act. The Court responded: "We are reluctant to ex-
tend [the area of per se illegality] on the bare pleadings and absent
examination of market effect and economic consequences. 79
The underlying rationale of the Court's decision can be stated sim-
ply. A patent is affected with a public interest. The public, therefore, is
greatly interested that a patent monopoly is free from taint of fraud. A
patent obtained by intentional fraud is against the public interest, and
the exercise of the monopoly power under such a patent contravenes
public policy.
Although the Walker Court cited Precision Instrument, the Court
neither mentioned nor adopted the "uncompromising duty" language
of Precision Instrument. The Walker Court also did not incorporate the
"highest degree of candor" standard suggested by Kingsland. While
the Court removed any doubt that knowledge and willfulness were es-
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
75. 382 U.S. at 174.
76. Id.
77. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1964),
rev'd, 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
78. 382 U.S. at 177.
79. Id. at 178.
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sential elements in determining the culpability of misconduct before
the patent office, 0 it did not address the question of the standard to be
applied by the patent office. Thus Walker vitiated the "uncompromis-
ing duty" standard of Precision Instrument.8'
Walker makes clear that only intentional fraud can evoke antitrust
claims, and that the court must examine economic data to determine
the impact of the use of the fraudulently procured patent on the market
for the product involved. Fraudulent procurement of a patent alone is
insufficient to establish a Sherman Act violation. A plaintiff must es-
tablish three separate and independent elements to substantiate a viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act on the basis of fraudulent
procurement of a patent:
(1) That the patent was procured by the commission of intentional fraud
on the Patent Office in the common law sense;
(2) That the fraudulently procured patent was used to exclude competi-
tion in a relevant market; and
(3) That the adverse competitive consequences required by Section 2 re-
sulted. 2
Although Walker is a domestic patent fraud case, it has been applied
successfully to international litigation. In Oetiker v. Jurid Werke,
G.m.b.H 3 a Swiss licensor granted an exclusive license to a German
licensee. The German licensee filed for German and United States pat-
ents. The German patent office refused to grant the patent because of
lack of invention over prior art. The Swiss licensor asserted patent
fraud on the licensee in attempting to procure a United States patent by
failing to inform the United States patent office of the prior art relied
on by the German office.84 Noting that the question of fraud is one of
fact, the court applied the Walker doctrine to find "that plaintiff has
alleged facts from which a court could ultimately find that the U.S.
patent was fraudulently procured. 81 5 Although the Oetiker court dis-
cusses the concept of relevant market in its monopolization analysis,
the court does not reflect on Walker, which made clear that it is "the
enforcement of a patentprocured by fraud on the Patent Office" that is
80. The requirement of knowledge and willfulness mandated by Walker was reiterated in
SSP Agricultural Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. See notes 65-72 supra and accompanying text.
82. 382 U.S. at 177-78.
83. 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 2-3.
85. Id. at 6.
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a necessary precondition to possible section 2 Sherman Act liability. It
is not the procurement of a fraudulent patent that brings antitrust lia-
bility to its owner; it is the assertion or enforcement of the issued patent
acquired by fraud.86 A fraud may be remedied, however, before being
"fully perpetrated" by the issuance of an illegal patent. The Patent Of-
fice Tribunals and the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals have au-
thority to investigate alleged fraud prior to issuance of a patent.87
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 18 Mannington alleged
that another American manufacturer of floor covering, Congoleum,
made fraudulent misrepresentations in procuring patents from foreign
patent offices, and that Congoleum enforced the foreign patents by
threatening to and filing infringement suits in foreign countries. Man-
nington further alleged that these acts restrained the export trade of the
United States by restricting the foreign business of Mannington and
other American competitors, and demonstrated an intent to monopo-
lize. 8 9
Mannington sought to apply the Walker doctrine to Congoleum's
foreign patents. Mannington also asserted that it need not prove the
invalidity of the foreign patents under the issuing countries' laws.
Mannington argued that this requirement was unnecessary because
Congoleum would be exposed to antitrust liability in the United States
if domestic patents were at issue.90 Mannington urged that even
though a patent is valid under the laws of a foreign nation, the patent
could not be exempt from antitrust liability if procured by conduct un-
acceptable to American standards. 91 The court noted that Walker held
only that a patent invalid under American law because of fraud may
expose a defendant to American antitrust penalties.92 After discussing
comity and foreign policy,93 the court extended the Walker doctrine to
conclude that subject-matter jurisdiction existed and remanded the case
to the district court to resolve the "knowing and willful" requirements
86. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.
Del. 1971).
87. Id.
88. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 1290.
90. Id. at 1295.
91. Id. This would make Congoleum liable for any activity abroad that impaired Manning-
ton's or another competitor's foreign business.
92. Id.
93. See notes 259-67 and accompanying text infra.
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under Walker.94
To lay the basis for an antitrust claim, Walker requires a showing
that the patentee committed intentional fraud on the patent office. The
misconduct must involve some element of wrongfulness, willfulness, or
bad faith. Nondisclosure, however, will not support an antitrust claim
because innocent or good faith nondisclosure is insufficient to find the
patent invalid or unenforceable. 95
The requirements necessary to satisfy intentional fraud are identical
to those required under common law. The common-law fraud re-
quires: (1) A material representation (2) that is false, and (3) known to
be false by the maker, or made recklessly as a positive assertion without
knowledge of its truth, and (4) made with the intention that the misrep-
resentation be acted or relied on, coupled with (5) the fact of justifiable
reliance by another (6) to his damage or injury.96 Silence will be the
equivalent of a false representation when there is a duty to speak or
present information under the principles of common-law fraud.97
Additionally the following elements must be established by clear and
convincing evidence to support an antitrust action for patent fraud: (1)
The patentee made an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact
to the patent office to obtain a patent; (2) knowledge by the patentee of
the falsity of the representation, or at least reckless disregard as to
whether it was true; and (3) reliance by the patent office on the misrep-
resentation.9
8
The elements of materiality and reliance are inevitably intertwined
because the question of whether the misrepresentation was a determi-
native influence is closely related to the issue of whether the patent
94. 595 F.2d at 1303.
95. The Court in Walker stated:
Walker's counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery obtained the patent by knowingly
and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office. Proof of this assertion would be
sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its exemption from the antitrust laws. By the same
token, Food Machinery's good faith would furnish a complete defense. This includes an
honest mistake as to the effect of prior installation upon patentability-so-called "techni-
cal fraud."
382 U.S. at 177.
The Court accordingly held that proof of honest mistake would constitute the requisite good
faith. Id.
96. Homelite v. Trywilk Realty Co., 272 F.2d 688, 691 (4th Cir. 1959). For a similar list of
requirements for deceit, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971).
97. Id.
98. See notes 99-121 infra and accompanying text.
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office should have relied on the misrepresentation.99 A misrepresenta-
tion is material only when knowledge of all the facts would have or
should have altered the decision to allow the application."° The as-
sessment of materiality necessarily involves the knowing or willful na-
ture of the motive to mislead the patent examiner. It is often difficult,
however, to ascertain the degree of evidence necessary to establish ma-
teriality.101
Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp. 102 is the leading
Supreme Court decision on the question of when an alleged fraudulent
representation to the patent office is material. The requirement, set
forth in Walker, that a patentee must obtain the patent by "knowing
and willful" misrepresentation of facts to the patent office, follows the
theme of materiality first announced in Corona. Corona is the forerun-
ner of the "but for" test when the Court made clear that the alleged
fraud must be the basis for the patent or essentially material to its is-
sue. 10 3 The "but for" test suggests that the patent office would not have
issued the patent, but for the fraud. Subsequent decisions have relied
on the Supreme Court's use of the word "obtained" to fashion the "but
for" test of materiality. 1°4
99. See Homelite v. Trywilk Realty Co., 272 F.2d 688, 691 (4th Cir. 1959).
100. The relationship of materiality and reliance is discussed in American Optical Corp. v.
United States, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682, 684 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
101. In the past courts had been less than willing to apply elements of common-law fraud to
conduct in patent cases, with some courts demonstrating a reluctance to find culpable fraud in
business conduct. See Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960). More recent
decisions demonstrate an increasing willingness to find fraudulently procured patents. See note
47 .rupra.
102. 276 U.S. 358 (1928). The Supreme Court found a patent office affidavit reckless but not
material to patentability. Id. at 374.
103. Id. at 374.
104. The court in Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D.
Del. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967),
stated:
Having found the plaintiff had an invention which was patentable over the prior art, as a
legal proposition, defendant's allegations of fraud must fail. Not only must the defend-
ant establish that an intentional misrepresentation was made to the patent examiner, but
also defendant must show that the misrepresentation was material, i.e., that the patent
would not have issued but for the fraud. Since the patentee was legally entitled to the
patent, any misrepresentation directed to overcoming the prior art, assuming arguendo
there were some, could not be material.
253 F. Supp. at 469-70.
In Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945),
the party given patent rights in accordance with an interference settlement agreement was held to
a strict duty of disclosure. As a result of his failure to disclose what he had reason to believe may
have been peijurious statements on the part of the party not given the patent, the patent was
Washington University Open Scholarship
142 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:123
The "objective" and "subjective" standards are two separate stan-
dards for determining whether a fraudulent misrepresentation is mate-
rial.10 5 The objective standard analyzes the misrepresentation from the
standpoint of whether the examiner should have allowed the applica-
tion based on available evidence.106 The subjective standard views the
materiality issue from the standpoint of what the examiner would have
done if aware of the true facts.'0 7 Both standards require that proof of
a material fraudulent misrepresentation be determined from the objec-
tive facts.108 The court, irrespective of which standard is chosen, must
determine whether the conduct in question is so reprehensible that the
public must be protected from the improvidently granted monopoly. 0 9
Other standards also exist to judge the materiality of misrepresenta-
tion."10 Regardless of the standard applied, a court must apply anti-
trust concepts in addition to principles of equity. Under Walker an
struck down as invalid and unenforceable. See, e.g., Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1969), af'd, 440 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886
(1971); Waterman Bic-Pen Corp. v. W.A. Shaeffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849 (D. Del. 1967).
105. See Kayton, Lynch & Stem, Fraud and Patent Procurement: Genuine and Sham Charges,
43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1974), in which the author comments on the two standards:
A focus upon the "but for" test, however, reveals that this test can be viewed both
subjectively and objectively. From an objective point of view, proof of but for material-
ity requires proof that Patent Office knowledge of the truth respecting the mis-
represented fact, when added to other facts bearing upon the issue of patentability would
have precluded either issuance of the patent or at least allowance of one or more claims
by application of Title 35. The subjective "but for" approach would require proof that
the patent examiner would not have granted the patent if he had known the truth re-
specting the misrepresented fact, regardless of whether that decision was correct or not.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("whether the misrepresenta-
tions made to the Patent Office, either expressly or impliedly, were false, is simply a question of
fact, to be decided on the evidence submitted.").
109. Id. at 793. The court reasoned:
[O]ne factor stands clear: the courts have become more critical in their interpretation of
the relationship existing between applicants for patent and the Patent Office and their
scrutiny of the conduct of applicants in light of that relationship. Not unlike those ap-
pearing before other administrative agencies, applicants before the Patent Office are be-
ing held to a relationship of confidence and trust to that agency. The indicated
expansion of the concept of "fraud" manifests an attempt by the court to make this
relationship meaningful.
Id.
110. See Kayton, Lynch & Stem, supra note 105, at 40. The authors advocate three types of
misrepresentations-relevant, remote, and irrelevant. In viewing these degrees of materiality on a
descending scale, the authors stress that in some instances the misrepresentation should be over-
looked. Id.
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applicant may be subject to treble damages when a court determines as
a matter of law that a patentee has fraudulently procured a patent.''
A court will award treble damages when monopoly power, inherent in
the patent grant, is used to restrain competition. The antitrust immu-
nity conferred on a valid patent should not extend to fraudulently ob-
tained and invalid patents, which by their terms will adversely affect
competition.
The second element of patent fraud is intent. Walker clearly indi-
cates that the applicant's misrepresentations be made "knowingly and
willfully.""' 2 Both knowledge and willfulness are rarely proven di-
rectly. Proof normally requires inference from circumstantial evidence.
Some element of wrongfulness or bad faith must accompany the mis-
conduct. Proof of negligent omission or misstatements before the pat-
ent office is not sufficient."13 Some courts infer fraudulent intent from
conduct that establishes a pattern of misrepresentation.' "4 Knowledge
of falsity created by an omission or misrepresentation coupled with
awareness or appreciation of its significance to patentability, often la-
111. 382 U.S. at 176-77.
112. Id.
113. See Xerox Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 322 F. Supp. 963, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which
the court stated:
Notwithstanding this thorough lacing of their papers with claims of fraud, defendants
ambivalently contend that proof of material misstatements or non-disclosure before the
Patent Office, standing alone and without establishment of an intent to deceive or of
recklessness, would amount to unclean hands. We disagree. The law is to the con-
trary . ..
Although it is difficult to formulate a standard that will encompass all types of miscon-
duct that would amount to inequity on the part of an applicant, the basic underlying
theme is that there must be some element of wrongfulness, willfulness or bad faith that
transgresses the basic concept of doing equity. It must be remembered that the purpose
of the unclean hands doctrine in patent cases is to discourage an applicant from taking
advantage of the fact that the prosecution of a patent application is essentially an ex
parie rather than an adversary proceeding and that the Patent Examiner accordingly
must rely heavily upon the information furnished to him by the applicant. However, to
deny enforcement as a matter of law merely because of an innocent or good faith nondis-
closure would go beyond what is necessary to protect the public against the improvident
granting of a monopoly.
See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1971), on
remand, 341 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
North Carolina v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974), af'd, 537 F.2d 67 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
114. See Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288,
295-97 (4th Cir. 1969) (findings taken together evidenced a course of conduct which, even if not
actually fraudulent, revealed a calculated recklessness about the truth, constituting a "serious
breach of duty to the Patent Office").
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beled "conscious deliberateness, ' 15 supports an inference of fraudu-
lent intent sufficient to invalidate a patent.1 1 6  Furthermore, gross
negligence or recklessness is sufficient to create an inference."t7 A court
should weigh the evidence of intent in light of the materiality of the
misrepresentation in conjunction with the motive the applicant might
have had in misleading the patent office.
The inevitable result of the lack of clear guidelines to measure mis-
conduct is confusion."i Thus the point at which an inference is created
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Once the patentee's knowledge of a material fact is established, and is
coupled with proof that the patentee appreciated the materiality of that
fact, no more evidence other than the manifest fact of the misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure must be elicited to prove "willfulness." In circum-
stances where the parties stand in a relationship of trust and confidence,
such as an applicant before the Patent Office, a conscious awareness of the
fact misrepresented or withheld should be sufficient.19
Generally, knowledge of the alleged misrepresentation to the patent of-
fice, coupled with an awareness or consciousness of the consequences,
probably will be sufficient.
Courts must not overlook the existence of a great body of law con-
cerning fraud and deceit. The Supreme Court's decision in Walker
implicitly recognizes the use of these principles to determine whether
misconduct before the patent office can support an antitrust claim. Yet
a prima facie determination, as well as the ultimate determination of
115. McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956).
116. See note 113 supra. See also Beckman Instrs., Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555,
564-66 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
117. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir.
1971) ("[w]holly inadvertent errors or honest mistakes which are caused by neither fraudulent
intent or design, nor by the patentee's gross negligence, do not constitute fraud under Walker"),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc. 306 F. Supp. 541, 566 (S.D.N Y.
1969) ("In view of the fact that the error arose from an honest mistake and not because of any
fraudulent intent or gross negligence on the part of the patentee, enforcement of the patent should
not be denied."), a~f'd inpart, rev'dinpart, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018
(1972).
118. Compare Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 443 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972) with Monsanto
Co. v. Rohn & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afi d, 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). In Monsanto v. Dawson the court emphasized that an intent to
deceive must be established when the allegation is withholding of information. 312 F. Supp. at
463. In Monsanto v. Rohn the court held that a specific intent to deceive is not necessary when
there is evidence of a deliberate withholding of material information. 312 F. Supp. at 792.
119. Kayton, Lynch & Stem, supra note 105, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
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culpability, should only follow after a weighted consideration of evi-
dence regarding materiality, intent, and motive.
The final element necessary to establish fraudulent procurement of a
patent is reliance. The patent office is necessarily limited in the time it
can spend to ascertain facts necessary to judge patentability because of
the immense volume of patent applications and because the office has
no testing facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court imposes the
highest standards of honesty and candor on the applicant.' 2 0 Thus the
patent office must rely on representations made in the application. A
court will not find reliance when the examiner had actual notice and
knowledge of the true and existing facts.' 2'
While principles of equity are necessary to evaluate alleged fraud,
Walker mandates that an antitrust claim can be predicated only on
fraudulent procurement, not on inequitable conduct.'2 2 Analysis of the
case law reveals that findings of fraudulent procurement have been
predicated on (1) misconduct involving the withholding of information
regarding prior art, (2) misconduct involving false statements in affida-
vits or in arguments made to the patent office, and (3) miscellaneous
conduct or actions.' 23
The withholding of information of prior art is generally not regarded
as fraudulent when the applicant believed in good faith that the art was
irrelevant to the claimed invention.'24 If the patent examiner had
120. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v.
Automotive Maintenance Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945); Coming Glass Works v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461,470 (D. Del. 1966), a4d in part, rev'dinpart, 374 F.2d 473
(3d Cir) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967).
121. In Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970), the court held:
Reliance and injury are the two remaining elements to be considered. In this case, of
course, we have already pointed out the finding of the board that the Curtiss claims were
allowed "in substantial measure" as a result of the representations made in the affidavit
and demonstration. Reliance is thus not in issue here, nor can there be any doubt that
the examiner's reliance was justified.
122. 382 U.S. at 177.
123. See notes 124-33 infra and accompanying text.
124. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972), the patent
for the chemical compound of the drug Darvon, manufactured by plaintiff, was found valid and
infringed. Defendant claimed that the patent was invalid because of plaintiffs bad faith nondis-
closure to the patent office of the relevant prior art, a closely related compound, which had been
disclosed in unpublished literature. The court noted that the related compound (the Chen com-
pound) had never been brought to the attention of the patent office "[flor some reason which is
really not satisfactorily explained." The court, however, said that "in no sense can this nondisclo-
sure be said to approach concealment or unfair dealing of the type discussed and condemned in
Beckman Instrs., Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc. 439 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1971)." 460 F.2d at 1102. The
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knowledge of the prior art through means other than the application,
the "but for" test would not be satisfied.'25 The inference of fraud is
created, however, if extrinsic evidence shows that the applicant deliber-
ately withheld information to mislead the examiner. 26 The suggestion
that culpable misconduct may be predicated only on the withholding of
anticipatory art is found in several cases before Walker. 27 Although
the "high duty" of disclosure standard exists, an applicant still can es-
tablish good faith in the event of failure to cite art that is nonan-
ticipatory. A court may excuse an applicant from failing to cite prior
irrelevant art.'28
Following Walker, courts have begun to examine more closely con-
duct that involves false or misleading affidavits.1 29 The present rule is
that an applicant, in submitting an affidavit, is "held to be representing
district court properly found that the inventor had simply and in good faith not considered the
Chen compound a relevant prior disclosure. In fact, if he had called the compound to the exam-
iner's attention, he would have made the scientifically correct assertion that it lacked the essential
value of his patented product Darvon.
125. See Alburger v. Magnaflux Corp., 444 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1971) (the court accepted the
explanation that the withheld art was irrelevant, noting that similar art was before the patent
office).
126. See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 881-82
(2d Cir. 1971) (court held that the applicant's failure to disclose to the examiner any of three
articles pertinent to the prior art could be found to be willful because the articles were of very
recent publication-one was by the applicant himself, and two were by former colleagues-and
must have been in the forefront of his mind), on remand, 341 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 474
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973); Beckman Instrs., Inc. v. Chemtronics,
Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1379-80 (5th Cir.) (patentee had deliberately failed to bring a prior art refer-
ence to the attention of the patent office and he knew it presented a serious threat to the validity of
the patent he was seeking), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970); Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Alloys Corp., 347 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (The district court found that the original
patent applicant had perpetrated fraud on the patent office by concealing material facts as to prior
art and commercial use, and that the parties attempting to enforce the patent knew of the circum-
stances surrounding the procurement of the patent. The court also found dominance in the rele-
vant market, the other element of a Sherman Act section 2 violation.), rev'don other grounds, 484
F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973).
127. See note 126supra. See, e.g., Wen Prods., Inc. v. Portable Elec. Tools, Inc., 367 F.2d 764,
767 (7th Cir. 1966); Admiral Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708, 716-17 (10th Cir. 1961),
(citing United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949, 952 (D. Mass. 1957)). But see
University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc., 422 F.2d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 1970),
vacated, 402 U.S. 313, on remand, 334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. InI. 1971), affid, 465 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972). See also Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 432 F.2d
1198, 1203 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971); Canaan Prods., Inc. v. Edward Don &
Co., 273 F. Supp. 492, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1966), a'd, 388 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1968).
128. See note 125 supra.
129. Cases prior to Walker tended to excuse misstatements or omissions in affidavits because
of lack of proof of fraud or bad faith. See, e.g., Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276
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that his showing includes a fair and accurate demonstration." 130 The
mere fact that the affidavit is misleading is not sufficient to constitute
fraud. The issue of materiality must be examined under the "but for"
test. No presumption exists that the misrepresentation was effective in
obtaining the patent. The patent office record may be examined to de-
termine what the examiner might have concluded had he been aware of
the nondisclosure. 131
Other conduct also may be inspected to find fraud. In United States
v. Singer Mfg. Co. 132 the Supreme Court held that collusive settlements
of interferences to assure issuance of a patent were improper and that
this activity could provide the basis for a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 33
Both Walker and Manningon Mills demonstrate that enforcement of
a fraudulently procured patent to exclude competitors from the market
is a violation of the antitrust laws. t34 Furthermore, the Department of
Justice has convinced the federal courts 135 that action resulting in fraud
on the federal courts is as offensive from an antitrust standpoint as is
fraud on the patent office. 136  Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in
Walker, aptly concluded that although private plaintiffs could institute
suits to recover treble damages for Sherman Act monopolization know-
ingly practiced under the guise of a patent procured by deliberate
U.S. 358, 374 (1928); Haloro, Inc. v. Owens-Coming Fibreglas Corp., 266 F.2d 918, 919 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
130. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See also SCM Corp. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
131. Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1975); Kolene Corp. v. Mo-
tor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 83 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971), aff'g 307
F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
132. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
133. Id. The Court opined:
In itself the desire to secure broad claims in a patent may well be unexceptionable-
when purely unilateral action is involved. . . . Singer and Gegauf agreed to settle an
interference at least in part, to prevent an open fight over validity. There is a public
interest here. . . which the parties have subordinated to their private ends--the public
interest in granting patent monopolies only when the progress of the useful arts and of
science will be furthered because as the consideration for its grant the public is given a
novel and useful invention. . . . When there is no novelty and the public parts with the
monopoly grant for no return, the public has been imposed upon and the patent clause
subverted.
Id. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
134. See notes 73-94 supra and accompanying text.
135. See Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967).
136. See Stem,A Future Look at Patent Fraud and Antitrust Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 1
(1970).
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fraud, these actions should not impinge on the policy of the patent laws
to encourage inventions and disclosure. 137 Justice Harlan, noting that
"deliberate fraud" was required, stressed that the Court did not hold;
that private antitrust suits might also reach monopolies practiced under
patents that for one reason or another may turn out to be voidable under
one or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a
patent [for such a result] might well chill the disclosure of inventions
through the obtaining of a patent because of fear of the vexatious or puni-
tive consequences of treble-damages suits. 138
Thus, the private antitrust remedy granted by Walker in the case of a
fraudulently obtained patent is not available to reach section 2 monop-
olies carried on under a nonfraudulently procured patent.
III. MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE
Regardless of whether it is termed "patent monopoly" or "patent
property," a patent system contains an aura of odious monopoly be-
cause of its prohibition on reinvention and use. 39 The use of a fraudu-
lently procured patent most likely violates section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Section 2 forbids monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
conspiracies to monopolize."° Additionally, section 1 of the Sherman
Act may be violated if a plaintiff can establish the requisite elements of
that section.' 4'
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States 42 and United States v. American Tobacco Co. ,143 courts have
137. 382 U.S. at 179-80.
138. Id. at 180, (cited in Handgaards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 989 n.6 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980)).
139. See Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961
(1979), in which the court emphasized that although the reference to "patent monopoly" is not
uncommon, the proper characterization is "patent property" as the patent right "is the fundamen-
tal element of all human rights called 'property."' Id. But see Adelman, Property Rights Theory
andPatent-Antitrust: The Role ofCompulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 985 n.31 (1977),
in which the author notes that Professor Machiup distinguished between "property" and "monop-
oly" by comparing the homeowner to a patentee. In the pure property rights setting the home-
owner can exclude trespassers, yet he cannot prevent construction of an identical house. The
patentee meanwhile has both the property right to exclude and monopoly right to prevent in-
dependent development.
140. See note 10 supra.
141. Id.
142. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
143. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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agreed that section 2 does not outlaw monopoly per se.' 44 Tradition-
ally, courts have interpreted section 2 to address the issue of monopoly
power' 45 achieved by acts that constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of section 1.146 The exercise of monopoly power in a
free market economy may interfere with the efficient allocation of re-
sources and result in a shift of wealth from consumers to producers that
inhibits technological innovation. Thus, although courts focus on in-
tent, wrongful purpose, exclusionary conduct, and defendant's preda-
tory practices, 47 exclusionary practices condemned as monopolization
by section 2 include certain business practices that are honestly indus-
trial and not prompted solely by a desire to prevent competition.14
Although Walker signifies that a fraudulently obtained patent can be
an illegal act of monopolization if the necessary elements of the offense
are present, the case nonetheless holds that fraudulent procurement of
a patent, alone, does not constitute a Sherman Act violation. The
Court expressly stated:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade
or commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to
appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the
relevant market for the product involved. 14 9
144. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge
Hand indicated grudging tolerance of a monopoly "thrust upon" a firm while noting the "strong
argument" against imposing liability on the "single producer" who survived "out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry." Id. at 429-30.
Thus a monopoly achieved by statutory grants, such as a patent, requires something beyond pos-
session of monopoly power to be unlawful.
145. Monopoly power has been held to be the "power to control prices" and "exclude compe-
tition." See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-11 (1946).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), a ff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
147. One major case expressed the view that "size does not determine guilt; that there must be
some 'exclusion' of competitors; that the growth must be something else than 'natural' or 'normal';
that there must be a wrongful intent or some other specific intent or that some unduly coercive
means must be used." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1927); United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
148. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge
Hand focused on the economic effects of business conduct, defined a market appropriate to evalu-
ate defendant's power, and measured the extent of defendant's share within that market.
149. 382 U.S. at 177. The patent must have been procured by fraud, have subsequently issued,
and have been enforced. See Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F.
Supp. 1329 (D. Del. 1971), in which an allegation that defendant, after filing a patent application
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The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 50 and the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power are necessary requi-
sites to find monopolization. 15 1 The relevant market assessment is a
had fraudulently induced the patent office to declare an interference with plaintiff's patent, failed
to state a claim of attempted monopolization under section 2. The court held:
[T]he sine qua non of a Sherman Act violation was fraud in the procurement of a patent
which... was ... enforced by the defendant in the action. Neither of these essential
elements of a Sherman Act offense is present or pleaded.., and these counts are legally
insufficient to state a Section 2 Sherman Act cause of action.
[I]t is not the mere obtaining of a fraudulent patent which brings antitrust liability to its
owner, it is the assertion or enforcement of the issued patent acquired by fraud which
creates antitrust liability.
Id. at 1331-32 (emphasis omitted). See also Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758
(Ist Cir. 1976) (proof of the exclusionary power of an allegedly invalid patent claim in terms of a
relevant market for the product involved is necessary to sustain a violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act).
150. The relevant market inquiry has been divided by the courts into two parts: (1) The rele-
vant product market, generally defined to be that area of goods or services in which the product or
products offered by the defendant effectively compete and, (2) the relevant geographic market,
generally defined as the geographic area of effective competition in which the product or service is
traded.
With respect to the product market, the issue is whether the proposed market is composed of
products that are elastic, ite., reasonably interchangeable in terms of price, use, and quality. Fur-
ther, there may be submarkets that may be considered sufficiently separate "parts of trade or
commerce" so as to bring section 2 into play. The geographic market is generally defined as the
area within which sellers of the particular product or service operate and within which purchasers
can obtain such products or services. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966);
United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). No monopolization deter-
minations can be made without an effort to establish the relevant market. See Universal Athletic
Sales Co. v. American Gym, 480 F. Supp. 408, 421 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
151. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). See also Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980)
("The mere possession of monopoly power does not ipsofacto condemn a market participant.");
California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,713, at 77,974-75
(9th Cir.); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 481 F. Supp. 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
Because size may be the unavoidable result of a legal monopoly or the consequence of vigorous
competitive activity, size absent unlawful conduct or an intent to monopolize, is not an antitrust
offense. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). Despite this well settled rule of law, however, some courts
suggest that the existence of monopoly power offends the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) ("monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired,
may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexer-
cised"); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) ("mere size. . . is not an offense
against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly");
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Congress. . . did not
condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbad all.").
Monopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). This power is a primary requisite to a
finding of monopolization and may be a factor in judging the reasonableness of alleged anticom-
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primary issue to determine the "part of trade or commerce among the
several states" involved, and whether defendants used a fraudulently
procured patent to violate the Sherman Act.'52
In Oetiker 1'3 the court did not resolve the question of whether proof
that the patent covers a substantial share of the relevant market is a
necessary element of a patent fraud claim. The court applied the
Walker doctrine to find that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts from which
a court could ultimately find that the United States patent was fraudu-
lently procured. The Oetiker court, however, was uncertain of whether
the Court in Walker would have held, after a full record had been de-
veloped, that the relevant market in a patent fraud case was always
coextensive with the claims of the fraudulently obtained patent. 154
The fraudulently procured patent must be used to exclude others
from the marketplace to comprise an antitrust violation. The patentee
or others with knowledge of the fraud' may accomplish the exclusion
by enforcement or threats of enforcement. 5 6 These acts alone, how-
ever, do not constitute a section 2 violation. Both monopoly power and
intent to exercise that power must be proven. If monopoly power is
found to exist and if the patent is used to exclude others from the mar-
ketplace, the trier of fact will presume intent to exercise that power.'5 7
petitive conduct. The court in Berkey Photo stated that section 2 is aimed at a "pernicious market
structure." 603 F.2d at 272. Monopoly power remains, however, a separate element of the of-
fense.
152. The Walker Court noted that availability of substitutes is crucial in defining the relevant
market. 382 U.S. at 177-78. See Kayton, Lynch & Stem, supra note 105:
Whether the subject matter ofa patent is a monopoly under the Sherman Act, therefore, is
ultimately a question offact. When there are several interchangeable products or
processes at more or less the same price, it is unlikely that the patent confers upon its
owner the power to set the price of either the subject matter of the patent or the products
embodying it as a component or element. Moreover, although the patentee has the
power to exclude competitors from making, using, and selling the specific patented prod-
uct, ownership of such a patent will not confer any power to keep competitors from
making, using, and selling the substitutes for the patented product. On the other hand, a
truly valuable orpioneerpatent may confer monopolypower upon its owner as a result of the
unique characteristics and uses of the product or the substantial cost savings that it alone
will permit.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
153. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying test.
154. 556 F.2d at 6.
155. 382 U.S. at 177 n.5.
156. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Del.
1971).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (the "existence of
[monopoly]... power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market");
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (the Court found that the economic power
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An important consideration to determine if monopoly power exists is
whether the patent is used as part of a scheme to dominate the market
and whether the patentee enjoyed sufficient monopoly power to domi-
nate the market. The percentage of the relevant market controlled is a
prime tool to assess monopoly power because "size is. . . an earmark
of monopoly power." 158 Size is particularly significant when the paten-
tee has abused its market strength in the past. 5 9 The courts, however,
have not formulated a precise percentage to determine when a firm
does control a predominant share of the market. The basic statement
of the rule by the Supreme Court is that "[t]he relative effect of percent-
age command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor is
placed." 6o
Supreme Court cases have described the percentage of market share
that will indicate monopoly power to range from 65 percent to 100 per-
cent.' 6' The Ninth Circuit'62 stated that a 50 percent market share
probably is insufficient to establish monopoly power. The Fifth Cir-
cuit,' 63 however, stated that there is no "rigid rule" that a firm with less
than 50 percent lacks monopoly power. The courts consider market
and industrial structure the most important factors in determining mo-
nopoly power under section 2. The analysis requires the court to ex-
amine all competitive factors that establish a seller's power to raise
prices or exclude competition. 6' Judge Newman in SCM Corp. v.
needed to restrain competition in a tied product would be presumed when the tying product was
patented).
158. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 n.10 (1948).
159. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
160. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948).
161. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87% market share "leaves
no doubt" as to monopoly power); International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States,
358 U.S. 242, 249 (1959) (81% and 93% market shares found to constitute monopoly power);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1946) (68-80% market share found
to constitute monopoly power); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,424 (2d Cir.
1945) (90% market share is enough to constitute monopoly power, 60-64% would be "doubtful,"
and 33% "certainly not."); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D.
Mass. 1953) (75% market share found to constitute monopoly power), ad per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954).
162. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
163. Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
164. The factors most often considered in making such a determination are: (1) Number of
firms in an industry (United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aF'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)); (2) size and strength of competitors (United States v. Co-
lumbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948)); (3) increase or decrease in defendant's market share
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Xerox Corp. 165 commented:
[O]nce a company had acquired monopoly power, it could not thereafter
acquire lawful patent power if it obtained new patents on its inventions
primarily for the purpose of blocking the development and marketing of
competitive products rather than to primarily protect its own products
from being imitated or blocked by others.
166
The existence of monopoly power is not unlawful unless coupled
with a general intent to exercise that power and the actual exercise of
the power.167 This intent may be inferred readily from the exclusion-
ary or unlawful practices to effect or maintain the monopoly. Thus, in
Alcoa the Court stated the intent element of monopolization in classic
common-law terms, and detected mens rea from objective acts that nat-
urally and predictably produced the proscribed result:
We need charge [Alcoa] . . . with no moral derelictions .... The only
question is whether it falls within the exception established in favor of
those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the control of a market. It seems
to us that that question scarcely survives its statement. It was not inevita-
ble that [Alcoa] ... should always anticipate increases in demand for the
ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep
doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. It
insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as
it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared
into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade con-
nections and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret "exclusion"
as limited to manoeuvres (sic) not honestly industrial, but actuated solely
by a desire to prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably pur-
sued, be deemed not "exclusionary." So to limit it would in our judgment
emasculate the Act; would permit just such consolidation as it was
designed to prevent. 6
In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to
monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as de-
manding any "specific" intent makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist
(United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920)); (4) past and probable develop-
ment of the industry (United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), af'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)); (5) ease of entry to the industry (United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)).
165. 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
166. Id. at 1007.
167. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
168. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
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monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing. So here, "Alcoa" meant to
keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot mar-
ket with which it started. That was to "monopolize" that market, however
innocently it otherwise proceeded.
169
The possession of monopoly power in attempted monopolization
cases is not considered an essential element because an attempt to mo-
nopolize infers that the defendant has not attained monopoly status.
The courts traditionally have viewed the offense of attempt to monopo-
lize as a single firm offense in which the requirement of specific intent
can be inferred from the defendant's conduct.
170
An attempt to monopolize has been defined as the "employment of
methods, means and practices which would, if successful, accomplish
monopolization, and which though falling short, nevertheless approach
so close as to create a dangerous probability of it.' ' 7 1 The requirement
of specific intent to achieve monopoly power cannot be inferred simply
from a general course of business conduct. A showing of acts or con-
duct from which an inference of wrongful intent can be drawn is re-
quired. 72 The court must evaluate the conduct with reference to a
relevant market, unless the conduct is of a type that will always be
predatory.173 No reason exists to require that defendant obtain a domi-
nant share of the relevant market to establish intent. Market structure,
market share, and the effect and legitimate objects of defendant's con-
duct are independently relevant to determine whether a court may rea-
sonably infer that defendant undertook a specific course of conduct to
acquire monopoly power. Thus, in a highly competitive market occu-
pied by only a few firms of similar size, inference of the subjective in-
tent necessary for attempted monopolization from market share alone
would be unreasonable. The conduct speaks for itself. If a given prac-
tice results from an objectively rational business decision, no inquiry is
needed into the subjective intent behind the practice. 74
169. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
170. Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 667 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); United States v. American Oil Co., 249 F. Supp. 799, 809 (D.N.J.
1966).
171. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) (emphasis added).
172. Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1022 (1973).
173. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrI UST LAW ' 836(b), at 352-53 (1978).
174. See, eg., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979), ceri.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, [1979-1] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 62,713, at 77,980 (9th Cir.). The role of the court is not to second guess business or
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In the domestic and international patent fraud context, the suffi-
ciency of proof of a fraudulently procured patent as establishing the
requisite intent was questionable after Walker."' In Manningon Mills
the court stated:
Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that the fraudulent procurement
of a patent may properly be viewed from the vantage point of antitrust
regulation as well as from the perspective of possible patent invalidity,
and that monopolistic conduct is not sheltered from the purview of the
antitrust laws merely because it involves the fraudulent procurement of
patent rights. This underlying rationale of Walker Process appears to be
just as applicable to monopolization through the fraudulent acquisition of
foreign patents as it is to monopolization through the fraudulent acquisi-
tion of United States patents. And, in the words of Justice Harlan, "as to
this class of improper patent monopolies, antitrust remedies should be
allowed room for full pay."' 176
Conduct must be demonstrated that the patentee intended to use the
patent to achieve monopoly power. The use of the exclusionary power
of the patent, coupled with knowledge of the patentability of achieving
market control, would seem sufficient. 177 Yet, the degree of conduct
necessary to prove unlawful monopoly is uncertain. Proposed legis-
laton replaces the need for proof of conduct in government monopoli-
zation suits seeking divestiture when there is proof of persistent
monopoly power. The legislation presumes that monopoly power per-
sistently maintained is almost always acquired through culpable con-
duct. 7 8
The other element of attempted monopolization, "dangerous
probability of success" in the relevant market, is established when de-
fendant exhibited the necessary power and committed overt acts to at-
tain a monopoly.179 No definite rules exist to define the relevant
engineering decisions. 603 F.2d at 287; Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 438-39
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aft'dsub noa. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,645 (9th
Cir.).
175. See 382 U.S. at 177-78.
176. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1300 (3d Cir. 1979).
177. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
178. See National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Law and Procedures, Report to the
President and the Attorney General 141-74 (1979); Maher, No-conduct Monopolization-Proposed
Legisation, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1979 at 1, col 1.
179. In Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972), the patentee's one-third share of the relevant market posed a
dangerous probability of monopolization. The patent had been obtained by fraud. Yet it is ques-
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market and the required quantum of market control. Yet, the market
share rules for monopolization apparently also apply for attempted
monopolization.180
The Ninth Circuit has abandoned the "dangerous probability of suc-
cess" requirement in favor of a showing of "anticompetitive conduct"
or "abusive trade practices," which seriously "impede the capacity of
others to compete."'' The court reasoned that the attempt offense
would not deter a firm that controlled less than 50 percent of the entire
market by leaving the firm "free to indulge in any activity however
unreasonable, predatory, destructive of competition and without legiti-
mate business justification."' 8 2 Although the Ninth Circuit's view may
have merit in patent fraud cases because patent fraud has no redeeming
social virtue, the court in Oetiker reasoned that:
The prevailing view has a number of advantages. Because of the
largely fictive character of "specific intent to monopolize," and the gen-
eral tendency of all competitive behavior to injure weaker competitors, it
is often difficult to distinguish between an illegal intent to monopolize
and a lawful intent to compete. A requirement that market power be
shown forces the courts to consider the market setting in which the chal-
lenged behavior took place, evidence which may illuminate both the ac-
tor's intent and the anticompetitive consequences of his conduct. Such a
requirement also tends to limit the application of the Sherman Act. . . to
those already powerful companies which have the least need for a broad
range of competitive tactics. Nevertheless, judicial adoption of the pre-
vailing view may leave lacunae in the coverage of the antitrust laws -
types of single firm behavior that are anticompetitive and yet not subject
to federal restraint.1
8 3
The law of section 2 is unchanged when intermeshed with patent
law. The plaintiff must show the existence of monopoly power plus
exclusionary conduct, or a specific intent to monopolize plus exclusion-
tionable whether the power to monopolize existed. This case represents a good example of the
importance of industry factors. Cf. Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 161-62 (7th Cir.
1973) (31.2% held to be an inadequate share of the relevant market).
180. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
181. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488, 504 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1040 (1978). The court found, "A prima facie case of attempt to monopolize is made out by
evidence of a specific intent to monopolize 'any part' of commerce, plus anticompetitive conduct
directed to the accomplishment of that unlawful purpose." Id.
182. Id.
183. 556 F.2d at 8.
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ary conduct. 18 4 Although a patent creates a legal monopoly of the pat-
ented art, the presence of a patent does not eliminate the need to show
possession or intent to acquire monopoly power. Furthermore, the
existence of monopoly power cannot be inferred merely from the pos-
session of one or more patents. 185  Lawfulness of aggregation rests
partly on a logical extension of the lawful exclusionary nature inherent
in each patent grant. If each patent is valid and the patentee does not
exceed the scope of the grant under each patent, accumulation does not
contravene either the patent or the antitrust laws. The accumulation of
power is only unlawful if exercised in a prohibited manner. Exclusion
may attain minimal market power if commercially feasible substitutes
exist. A single patent, however, may convey sufficient power to consti-
tute a monopoly if close substitutes do not exist or if the process is the
only commercially feasible one. Thus, the existence of a patent does
not necessarily prove monopoly power or monopolization. The rele-
vant market and the power of the defendant must be proven indepen-
dently.
Nonetheless, the acquisition of a patent may be exclusionary when
the acquisition meets the basic test for exclusionary conduct." 6 A pat-
ent acquisition is exclusionary when it is not an honest industrial ex-
pression of superior "skill, foresight and industry," but represents a
deliberate effort to preempt others. 187 For example, in United States v.
184. 382 F.2d at 177-78.
185. In Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), the Supreme
Court established a standard embracing as lawful the accumulation of patents based on new inter-
nally developed inventions. Although Hazeltine had accumulated 570 patents, the Court ruled
that "the mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal." Id. at
834. This approval originated from United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897),
in which the Supreme Court approved the accumulation of improvement patents on new inven-
tions that made the telephone "the most serviceable" despite extension of "the practical continu-
ance of the telephone monopoly" beyond the expiration of the basic Bell patent. 339 U.S. at 249-
50.
186. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945), the court
stated that many alleged exclusionary practices simply reflect a monopolist's superior product,
business acumen, or skill, foresight, and industry, and not willful maintenance of monopoly
power. These practices are of the type encouraged by the antitrust laws.
187. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 509 (1977). The propositions
that apply are the same ones applicable to the acquisition of any other scarce resource. If acquisi-
tion of a resource is not necessary to a firm's growth and development, but has for its major
purpose or effect inhibition of growth of competing firms, it is exclusionary, as in Akcoa. In the
case of patents no objection exists if a firm with monopoly power invents a new process that
increases efficiency, but a different reaction results if company policy is to outbid all others and
purchase outright every patent remotely relating to its technology, whether usable or not. Id.
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UnitedShoe Machinery Corp. ,18 United Shoe accumulated many of its
2000 patents through efforts of its research program. Yet United Shoe
unlawfully acquired the majority' of its patents by assignment from
others willing to avoid infringement suits. Thus, a conscious corporate
policy that utilizes fraudulent means to acquire or procure and enforce
patent applications or acquisitions also should be considered a perni-
cious exclusionary anticompetitive restraint which violates section 2.
Both Walker and its progeny a"9 demand that the patentee control the
relevant market for an antitrust violation to exist. Although the major-
ity of courts require a dangerous probability of success in attempted
monopolization cases involving a fraudulently procured patent, the
Ninth Circuit's position, which advocates an anticompetitive conduct
standard,190 has gained support. 191
If deliberate or wanton conduct exists, no policy reason is present to
shield a patentee from the private damage provisions of the Clayton
Act.' 92 Any other policy encourages a patentee's antisocial conduct.
On the other hand, antitrust liability should not attach to legitimate
attempts to enforce a patent obtained in good faith. The extensive so-
cial and economic consequences of a patent grant the public a para-
mount interest to ensure that patent monopolies are awarded absent
fraud or other inequitable conduct, and that patent monopolies are ad-
ministered within the legitimate scope. This doctrine has been applied
in the international setting when United States commerce is affected. 1
93
188. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
189. See, e.g., Acme Precision Products, Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237, 1244
(8th Cir. 1973).
190. See notes 181-82 supra and accompanying text.
191. The Author agrees with the position taken by the authors in Kayton, Lynch & Stem,
supra note 105, at 72 (1974), in which they state:
An effort to eliminate a competitor from the field, whether the field is a market or
simply a business, by enforcing a known spurious patent is a practice so inherently perni-
cious or competitively destructive in tendency, and so without legitimate justification or
redeeming value, that a comprehensive analysis of economic impact would be pointless.
Courts should, therefore, allow a party damaged by such conduct to recover treble dam-
ages for lost sales, litigation costs, and other losses, under a monopolization theory, if the
patentee achieves a "true monopoly," and on an attempted monopolization theory, if he
did not. At the very least, the court should shift to the patentee the expense and burden
of establishing that the subject matter of the patent is not a relevant market. They may
readily do so by examining the actions of the patentee who deliberately enforces a fraud-
ulently procured patent.
192. See note 74 supra.
193. In Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court quoted the
view of Professor Cooper:
mhe case of imposing liability on a firm that tries to enforce a patent known to have
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IV. THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND APPLICATION OF SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT TO THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL
PATENTS
The business practice and competition laws of a foreign nation gov-
ern the conduct of an American firm engaged in business abroad. For
example, the European Economic Community (EEC) countries' regu-
lations on transfer of technology are both national and regional in
scope. The antitrust laws are found principally in articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome.'94 The rules on competition for the EEC parallel
provisions of the United States antitrust laws. Article 85 prohibits cer-
tain "concerted practices. . which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition." 195 Those practices
that article 85(1) specifically forbids include (a) price-fixing; (b) limit-
ing or controlling production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment; (c) sharing markets or sources of supply; (d) applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties; and (e) tying arrangements. 19 6 Article 85 explicitly exempts cer-
tain restrictive practices that would fall under the prohibtion of 85(1)
for any agreement that "contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
been fraudulently procured verges on the overwhelming. It is extraordinarily hard to
conjure up the competitive advantages of deliberate fraud. The effort to enforce the
patent in itself reflects the judgment of the firm that some commercial gain can be reaped
from the effort. The impact of the patent on rivals in the marketplace may easily reach
far beyond the limits that a court would ultimately place on it; ignorance, uncertainty as
to eventual judicial interpretation, the great cost of patent litigation, the ease of accepting
license arrangements that have been accepted by most competing firms, and the disas-
trously broad effects frequently produced by threats against customers of the coerced
firm all contribute to this result. Although the brocard that a patent is a legally conferred
monopoly carries precious little value, certainly an attempt to enforce a fraudulently
obtained patent would justify taking the bad actor at the full value of its own judgment
and imposing monopolization liability for misuse of rights falling into an otherwise valid
category of "monopoly." While these considerations may not justify dispensing with an
analysis of market setting, they may support other means of showing a "dangerous
probability of success" than a simple demonstration of market share.
Id. at 8-9 (quoting Cooper, Atempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373, 416-17 (1974)).
194. See the United States International Trade Commission publication, International Tech-
nology Transfer: A Reyiew of Related Legal Issues 37 (Jan. 1979). For a complete discussion of
foreign antitrust laws, see E. KuNTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER
ch. 11 (1974).
195. International Technology Transfer: A Review ofRelated Legal Issues 37 (Jan. 1979).
196. Id.
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while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit .. ." 19
Article 86 of the Treaty provides that abuse by an enterprise of its
dominant position within the Common Market is incompatible with
the Common Market purpose because it may potentially affect trade
between member states. 198 Article 86 is similar to section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. Article 86 condemns, (a) direct or indirect imposition of un-
fair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b)
limitation of production, markets, or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers; (c) application of dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties; and (d) imposition of
tying arrangements that have no connection with the subject of the con-
tracts. 199
Application of the United States antitrust laws is particularly impor-
tant to American firms engaged in foreign commerce because patent
rights generally have not been affected by the prohibitions of article 85,
and because article 86, while prohibiting abuse of a dominant position,
does not prohibit acquisition of a dominant position.20 The Depart-
ment of Justice, however, applies the following policy to foreign trade
involving United States commerce: "[N]o manner of trade between
this country and any other is beyond the [Sherman] Act's reach."'20 1
One of two major goals of the Department in its enforcement of the
United States antitrust laws in international commerce is to protect
American export and investment opportunities against privately im-
posed restrictions.2 2 Although the Sherman Act explicitly applies to
"trade or commerce. . . with foreign nations,' ' 20 3 neither the Act nor
its legislative history clearly indicates the scope of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction conferred, and leaves this determination to the courts. 204
The focal point of the extraterritorial controversy is the issue ofjuris-
diction. The jurisdictional problems arising under the Sherman Act es-
sentially involve the power of the United States judiciary over
commercial and trade activities of imports into and exports from the
197. Id.
198. See E. KINTNE, & M. JOELSON, supra note 194, at 219.
199. See International Technology Transfer: A Review of Related Legal Issues 37 (Jan. 1979).
200. Id. at 37-38.
201. Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Act, 18 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. Rav. 199, 203 (1977).
202. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 10 supra.
204. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 201, at 202.
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United States. The extraterritorial reach of the United States antitrust
laws has been the subject of controversy since Judge Learned Hand's
decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) .205 The
Supreme Court acknowledged after American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. ,2o6 and before Alcoa, that acts and agreements occurring
outside United States territorial boundaries, which adversely and ma-
terially affect American trade, were not necessarily immune from the
United States antitrust laws. 20 7 While this test is easily satisfied,20 8 it
has been criticized for impairing foreign relations.2 °9 Judge Hand con-
205. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Alcoa case was the culmination of a series of cases
dealing with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. In American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), the Supreme Court denied extraterritorial application to
the Sherman Act. Focusing on sovereignty, American Banana reflected the view that the subjec-
tive territoriality theory was the only possible basis of legislative jurisdiction. Two years later,
however, the Court shifted to what was an objective territorial approach, and asserted jurisdiction
over a conspiracy entered into abroad between an American corporation and a British corpora-
tion, but which had effects within the United States. These effects were presumably considered
extensions of the conspiratorial act itself, which thus served as the basis for jurisdiction. United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). There followed a series of cases that, al-
though not overruling American Banana, emphasized as one important factor the effects that the
challenged activity had on United States commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
Alcoa, however, finally laid to rest the holding of American Banana that the Sherman Act had
no extraterritorial application. 148 F.2d at 443. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 201, at 212.
206. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243
U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913). Sisal
was the first step in the erosion of American Banana's requirement that conduct must occur within
United States territory. The Court held that jurisdiction would exist even though part of the
alleged conduct occurred outside of the United States. 274 U.S. at 275-76. After Alcoa, Continen-
tal Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), completed the rejection of the
territorial aspect of the American Banana holding. 370 U.S. at 704.
208. For example, two lower court decisions have rendered the "intent" part of the effects test
almost meaningless. In United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), the
court found that the Sherman Act permitted jurisdiction over an agreement among foreign com-
panies to divide and allocate the world market. The court seemingly substituted knowledge of
effects for intent to affect, holding that the intent requirement was satisfied in that the alien corpo-
rations involved knew or should have known that their agreement was part of a plan on the part of
General Electric to eliminate competition from foreign companies in the United States market.
Id. at 891. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
the intent requirement was further eroded. The court held that only a general intent to affect
commerce was required and that the defendant was "presumed to intend the natural consequences
of his actions." Id. at 227 (quoting W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
48 (2d ed. 1973)).
209. Some critics are concerned by the assertion of jurisdiction in situations in which none of
the activity takes place in the United States and in which none of the parties would normally be
subject to personal jurisdiction. The argument is that the "effects test" oversteps the boundaries
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cluded in Alcoa that although Congress did not intend the Sherman
Act to prohibit conduct not affecting the United States, Congress did
intend the Act to reach contracts, combinations, and conduct abroad,
including conduct of exclusively foreign companies, z l° if the conduct or
activity was intended to restrain or affect United States foreign com-
merce and actually did result in anticompetitive effects on domestic
commerce. 2  Alcoa effectively undermined the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in American Banana in which Justice Holmes doubted the intent of
Congress to extend the Sherman Act to actions perpetrated beyond
United States territory. The Supreme Court later supported Judge
Hand's holding in Alcoa.2 12
Although the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law supports the
"effects" test213 of Alcoa, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Guidefor
International Operations214 adopts a "substantial and foreseeable" re-
quirement before utilizing the effects test. The Antitrust Guide but-
tresses section 18 of the Restatement, which grants jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law attributing legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside its territory, when the conduct causes an effect within the
territory if:
(i) [T]he conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii)
it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the terri-
tory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by States that have reasonably developed legal sys-
set by international law by concentrating on effects within the United States and ignoring the
interests of other nations. These critics argue that jurisdiction should apply only when the effects
are "direct and physical" and not when they are "remote" and "difficult to establish" as they are
when the crime involved is economic. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 201, at 222-23. See also
Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos Constructing a Normative Theory ofthe Sherman Act's Extra-
territorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 733, 751 (1977).
210. This is the reason why the United States antitrust laws were held to apply in Oetiker v.
Judd Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Oetiker involved a Swiss licensor suing a
German licensee for trying to procure a fraudulent patent from the United States patent office.
For a more complete discussion, see note 83 supra and accompanying text.
211. 148 F.2d at 443-45. In Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western, 473 F. Supp.
680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court held that, "it is probably not necessary for the effect on foreign
commerce to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not de minimus."
212. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); United States v.
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1947).
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965).
214. See note 13 supra.
[Vol. 59:123
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/8
PATENT FRAUD AND ANTITRUST
tems.2 15
The Department of Justice has taken the position that, "when foreign
transactions have a substantial andforeseeable effect on U.S. commerce,
they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place," 216 and
the antitrust laws will apply when foreign activities will have a direct or
intended effect on either United States consumers or export opportuni-
ties.2" 7 Conflict, however, still remains. While the Antitrust Guide re-
quires an intended effect on United States commerce as an element of
the jurisdictional test applied to foreign activity of American compa-
nies, the court in Alcoa stated that intent was a requirement only for
foreign conduct of alien companies.218 One court has accepted the Al-
coa intent requirement, and rejected an American company's defense
of lack of intent to restrain trade.219
Although courts must define the precise scope of the Sherman Act
and the test to determine whether specific conduct falls within its
prohibitions, 220 the myriad of case-by-case determinations have not ad-
equately delineated the realm of the Act. Lower federal courts have
relied on the Supreme Court's frequent reiteration that "Congress
wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in re-
straining trust and monopoly agreements .... -221 Thus,
the Sherman Act's applicability to foreign commerce is as broad as Con-
gress's power under the commerce clause, which Chief Justice Marshall
described as including "every species of commercial intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations." No manner of trade between this
country and any other is beyond the Act's reach.222
When the restraint occurs outside the flow of commerce and the re-
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18b
(1965) (emphasis added).
216. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 6 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 7.
218. 148 F.2d at 444.
219. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), a ffd
andmod.Med, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
220. See, e-g., Baker, Antitrust and World Trad" Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 16 (1974); Rosenthal, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in U. S. Export Trade, 77 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 214, 219 (1977).
221. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 278 (1975); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
222. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 201, at 203 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824)). The authors note that the "Sherman Act therefore applies to import and
export transactions, other commercial transactions, and transportation and communications be-
tween the United States and a foreign country." Id. (citations omitted).
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straint has an "effect" on that commerce, "foreign commerce" within
the meaning of the Act may exist if there is a sufficient nexus between
the activity and the United States.223
Not only does a domestic firm engaging in a foreign market expose
itself to the United States antitrust laws, but also a foreign firm's trans-
actions will be subject to the United States antitrust laws if significant
commerce in the United States market is restrained. 2 4 The Director of
the Office of Policy Planning of the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice has noted the effort to extraterritorially extend the
United States antitrust laws because of domestic effects of foreign con-
duct:
U.S. antitrust officials have generally believed that the broad and even
extraterritorial scope of our antitrust laws, our long-arm statutes, our
courts' willingness to pierce corporate veils, and, most importantly, the
attractiveness and size of our national market, have enabled us to be quite
successful in policing and controlling those restrictive practices of mul-
tinational corporations which might adversely affect U.S. commerce.225
The Antitrust Guide incorporates this view:
[A firm] which has no business activities at all in the United States, may
be more difficult to reach under the U.S. antitrust laws, but the Depart-
ment will try to include all appropriate defendants in every case. If [the
firm] has property in the United States, it may be seized under certain
circumstances to induce consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. antitrust
court.
2 2 6
Although the Department's policy evolved from events occurring in
the petroleum market during 1973,227 the policy is not restricted to that
market. Since 1909228 American courts have consistently found sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Although application
of United States antitrust laws abroad always raises the question of
jurisdiction, subject-matter and personal jurisdiction are easily found.
223. Id. at 203 n.24.
224. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 6-7.
225. Remarks of Joel Davidow, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United
States Department of Justice, before the Symposium on Private Investments Abroad, Southwest-
ern Legal Foundation, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing World
809 (June 15, 1976) (copy on file at the offices of the CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JoURNAL).
226. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 56.
227. Id. at 50-61.
228. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). For an understand-
ing of why American Banana has been the only case denying subject-matter jurisdiction, see notes
205-11 supra and accompanying text.
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The acts of United States citizens in a foreign nation normally are sub-
ject to the laws of that country.229 Yet, "the U.S. law in general, and
the antitrust laws in particular, are not limited to transactions which
take place within our borders.023° The court in Mannington Mills, 3
using the substantial effects test, stated in reference to subject-matter
jurisdiction that, "it can no longer be doubted that practices of an
American citizen abroad having a substantial effect on American for-
eign commerce are subject to the Sherman Act."232 The decision in
Manningon Mills quoted the Court's statement in Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co. 233 that "Congress in prescribing standards of conduct for
American citizens abroad may project the impact of its laws beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States. '234 The Manningon Mills
court acknowledged the basic tenet that a nation's legislation is valid
only in the territory it governs233 5 Nevertheless, the court held that
"when two American litigants are contesting alleged antitrust activity
abroad that results in harm to the export business of one, a federal
court does have subject-matter jurisdiction. 23 6
The Mannington Mills theory of subject-matter jurisdiction is also
applicable to foreign nationals not engaging in United States trade.
The phrase "substantial and foreseeable effect on United States com-
merce" is a catch-all test that is difficult for foreign firms to escape.
Considerations of jurisdiction, enforcement, and comity generally pro-
mote the same conclusion: All parties conducting transactions abroad,
whether or not dealing with an American firm, are subject to the
United States antitrust laws if their activity substantially and
foreseeably affects American commerce.237 In Oetiker the court held
that attempted fraud on the United States patent office "substantially
229. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 9-10 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs §§ 20,30 (1965); Antitrust Guide,
supra note 13, at 6.
230. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 6. See notes 207-16 supra and accompanying text.
231. See notes supra 88-94 and accompanying text.
232. 595 F.2d at 1292.
233. 344 U.S. 280 (1952). Steele was a case involving trademark infringement under the Lan-
ham Trade Mark Act of 1946.
234. Id. at 282.
235. 595 F.2d at 1292.
236. Id. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)).
237. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 6.
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affected" United States commerce to support jurisdiction.238
The court in Oetiker noted that personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent patentees239 is not difficult to obtain.24 ° The general trend has
been to expand the personal jurisdiction of the courts to reach paten-
tees not present in the traditional jurisdictional sense.24' The Antitrust
Guide notes that the Department of Justice will seek to exercise the
fullest permissible jurisdiction over those "cartelizing" American mar-
kets.242
While subject-matter jurisdiction may be easily asserted because of a
broad interpretation of the effects doctrine and personal jurisdiction
found because of a telex message or telephone call made abroad to the
United States,243 the question must be asked how far foreign govern-
ments will yield to the assertion of United States jurisdiction over acts
committed outside the United States simply because the act may signif-
icantly affect American commerce?2 " The Department of Justice con-
tends that the traditional affirmative defenses of act of state,245 foreign
238. 556 F.2d at 5-6. For a complete discussion of Oetiker, see notes 83-86 supra and accom-
panying text.
239. 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1976) provides:
Nonresident patentee; service and notice
Every patentee not residing in the United States may file in the Patent and Trademark
Office a written designation stating the name and address of a person residing within the
United States on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting the
patent or rights thereunder. If the person designated cannot be found at the address
given in the last designation, or if no person has been designated, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons shall be
served by publication or otherwise as the court directs. The court shall have the same
jurisdiction to take any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder that it would
have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the court.
240. 556 F.2d at 5 n.10.
241. See Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., A.C., [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,456
(S.D.N.Y.).
242. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 8.
243. See Stanford, The Application ofthe Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: .4
View FromAbroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 195, 202 (1978). A defendant no longer must reside or
be present within the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. The only constraint is a minimum
contact with the jurisdiction and that exercise of the court's power not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice." See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
244. See Stanford, supra note 243, at 202.
245. 595 F.2d at 1292-93. The act of state doctrine is a policy of judicial abstention from
inquiry into the validity of an act by a foreign government.
The premise of the doctrine is that an act by the sovereign power of a foreign state or by
its authorized agent in its own territory... cannot be questioned or made the subject of
legal proceedings in United States ourts.... [Tihe doctrine requires an American
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governmental compulsion,246 comity,247  and sovereign immunity248
must be claimed "more broadly than seems appropriate if the Depart-
ment is to carry out its essential function of protecting the competitive-
ness of U.S. markets and export opportunities. 249
The Department of Justice position reflects determinations made by
federal courts in the aftermath of Alcoa. In Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. 250 the Supreme Court extended the
Sherman Act to a case involving exports. In Continental Ore the com-
plainant alleged that Union Carbide and its Canadian subsidiary con-
spired with another American firm to monopolize trade in vanadium.
The Court stated, in reversing the Ninth Circuit's determination of lack
of causation between the complainant's injury and the alleged viola-
court to reject private claims based on the contention that the damaging act of another
nation violates either American or international law.
Id See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977) (act of state doctrine was applied to
dismiss antitrust conspiracy claims when Libya nationalized its oil fields). See also Continental
Ore v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897); Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Act of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247,
1255 & n.36 (1977).
246. The foreign compulsion doctrine shields from antitrust liability the acts of parties carried
out in obedience to the mandate of a foreign government. The doctrine is not concerned with the
legality or validity of the foreign government's order, but rather with whether it compelled Ameri-
can enterprises to violate the United States antitrust laws. The foreign decree must be basic and
fundamental to the alleged antitrust behavior and more than merely peripheral to the overall
illegal course of conduct. Compare Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (defendant not held responsible for a boycott forced on it by the Vene-
zuelan government) with United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (American banks
found guilty of soliciting Mexican legislation to facilitate establishment of a cartel to monopolize
American imports).
247. The principle of comity, respect for procedures and laws of foreign nations, is expressed
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965):
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is
required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its
enforcement jurisdiction ....
248. The Antitrust Guide notes that sovereign immunity is a defense to personal jurisdiction
only for conduct of the sovereign acting in its "sovereign" capacity rather than in a "proprietary"
capacity. Antitrust guide, supra note 13, at 8. See Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706
(1976). The doctrine of sovereign immunity is similar to the act of state doctrine. A shift in focus
has occurred from the notion of the "dignity of independent nations" to concerns for preserving
the "basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers" and
not hindering the executive's conduct of foreign policy by judicial review or oversight of foreign
acts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1964).
249. Antitrust Guide, supra note 13, at 8.
250. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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tion, that cases followingAmerican Banana illustrated that "[a] conspir-
acy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries. '251 The
Court noted in dictum that some impact on United States foreign trade
would support jurisdiction.u 2
In United States v. Minnesota Manufacturing and Mining Co. 253 four
leading manufacturers of coated abrasives in the United States formed
an export and holding company to which the export company trans-
ferred patents and technology to the holding company. The manufac-
turers formed jointly owned subsidiaries in Britain, Canada, and
Germany because direct exports from the United States to those coun-
tries were impractical. The United States parent manufacturers agreed
not to export to areas where they had formed jointly owned factories.
Judge Wyzanski found this arrangement to restrain unlawfully Ameri-
can exports by the parent companies. 254 Thus, the Sherman Act was
extended to cover restraint of potential commerce when, but for the
restraint, commerce would have existed otherwise.
In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. 255 two American
companies sued three United Kingdom companies alleging that de-
fendants imposed unreasonably short terms and notice of termination
provisions in their distributorship agreements.256 The court denied a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and stated that
distribution of whiskey to the United States affected United States for-
eign commerce. The court noted that the intent requirement of Alcoa
is "a general intent to affect commerce, 'and may be satisfied by the
rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his
actions.' Defendant's intent to affect United States commerce is infera-
ble from the assignment of exclusive distributorship rights in the
United States. ' 257 The court substantially eased plaintiff's burden of
proving intent to affect American commerce by permitting the trier of
fact to infer intent.
In Mannington Mills the Third Circuit rejected traditional defenses
251. Id. at 704. See note 207 supra.
252. Id. at 705 n.13.
253. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
254. Id. at 958-61.
255. 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
256. Id. at 226.
257. Id. at 227.
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to jurisdiction. Defendant contended that the act of state doctrine and
sovereign immunity should apply because acquisition of foreign pat-
ents could be accomplished only by affirmative foreign governmental
action. The court responded: "[We are unable to accept the proposi-
tion that the mere issuance of patents by a foreign power constitutes
either an act of State, as that term has developed under the case law, or
an example of government compulsion. '258 The court stated in refer-
ence to the foreign compulsion defense that, "[w]here the governmental
action rises no higher than mere approval, the compulsion defense will
not be recognized. It is necessary that foreign law must have coerced
the defendant into violating American antitrust law." 259 The court
noted that an element of collusion must exist and that the issuance of
patents by foreign governments did not force Congoleum to exclude
Mannington Mills from foreign markets. The grant of a patent alone
does not provide the necessary degree of collusion.26 °
Judge Weis in Mannington Mills noted that comity considerations
were probably the most important factor in determining the existence
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Judge Weis summarized the jurisdic-
tional conflict in the following manner:
The antitrust statutes enacted by Congress commit this country to the
free enterprise system and the exercise of open competition. If an Ameri-
can company is excluded from competition in a foreign country by fraud-
ulent conduct on the part of another American company, then our
national interests are adversely affected. In a purely domestic situation
the right to a remedy would be clear. When foreign nations are involved,
however, it is unwise to ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity,
comity, and limitations of judicial power are considerations that should
have a bearing on the design to exercise or decline jurisdiction.261
The Mannington Mills court applied the "balancing test" adopted by
the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica.262 In
258. 595 F.2d at 1293-94.
259. Id. at 1293.
260. d. at 1294. The court held that:
The granting of the patents per se, in substance ministerial activity, is not the kind of
governmental action contemplated by the act of state doctrine or its correlative, foreign
compulsion. We conclude, therefore, that the asserted act of state defense does not sup-
port dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and it does not apply to the patents issued in the
foreign countries.
Id.
261. Id. at 1296. Judge Weis noted that several decisions by American courts had been criti-
cized for failing to adequately assess these concerns. Id.
262. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Timberlane Lumber the court held that the "intended effects" test of
Alcoa was "incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' inter-
ests. Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of the rela-
tionship between the actors and this country. ' 26 3  Realizing that
mechanical application of the Alcoa test might result in unduly broad
assertions of jurisdiction when comity consideration would dictate dis-
missal, the court in Timberlane Lumber reasoned:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations
or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which en-
forcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the rela-
tive significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative im-
portance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these facts should
identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted.
A difference in law or policies is one likely sore spot, though one which
may not always be present. Nationality is another; though foreign gov-
ernments may have some concern for the treatment of American citizens
and businesses residing there, they primarily care about their own nation-
als.264
After analyzing the "jurisdictional rule of reason" test of Timberlane
Lumber, Judge Weis opined that the concern for international comity
did not require a court to enforce the Sherman Act extraterritorially
whenever a party's conduct was also subject to regulation by a foreign
government. Problems of international comity become significant only
when foreign law requires conduct'inconsistent with the Sherman
Act.2 65 Therefore, the court ruled that subject-matter jurisdiction ex-
263. Id. at 611-12. In Dominicus American Bohio v. Guf and Western the court stated that,
"the effects test alone is inadequate, because it fails to take into account potential problems of
international comity." 473 F: Supp. at 687. The court adopted the Timberlane Lumber balancing
test, noting "the proper standard is a balancing test that weighs the impact of the foreign conduct
on United States commerce against the potential international repercussions of asserting jurisdic-
tion." Id.
264. Id. at 614-15. In interpreting the effects test Judge Weis in Manninglon Mills quoted
Judge Hand's statement in Aicoa:
[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the
limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limita-
tions which generally correspond to those fixed by the "Conflict of Laws." We should
not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequence within the United States.
595 F.2d at 1301.
265. Id. at 1302.
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isted because:
[(1)] [Tlhere [was] no indication that Congoleum was conforming to a
rule of conduct prescribed by foreign law when it allegedly undertook to
monopolize trade in twenty-six nations by fraudulently procuring patents
in those nations;
[(2)] Congoleum was [not] compelled by a foreign nation to make ma-
terially false representations; and
[(3)] Congoleum, [as an American company] allegedly masterminded
and directed its monopolization scheme from its headquarters in New
Jersey with the intention of affecting its American competitors' export
markets.266
The court held that application of American law would not adversely
impair the policies of most foreign nations. The court concluded that
subject-matter jurisdiction over the antitrust claims existed, and re-
manded the case to the district court for proceedings on the merits.
Mannington Mills would be obligated at the district court to establish
that Congoleum procured the foreign patents through knowing and
willful fraud and that this conduct constituted monopolization of a rel-
evant market of the foreign trade of the United States under Walker.z67
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of international business transactions involving Ameri-
can firms or markets generally will not invoke United States antitrust
law enforcement because these transactions will not have a substantial
and adverse effect on United States consumers or competition even
though they may affect American commerce sufficiently to meet mini-
mum contact standards to establish federal jurisdiction.268 Addition-
ally, courts may refuse to find the requisite effect if granting jurisdiction
will unduly interfere with the internal affairs of foreign nations.269
Nevertheless, the United States antitrust laws play many useful roles in
international commerce by effectuating and symbolizing the United
266. Id. The court further held that:
The dictate of the Sherman Act that Congoleum refrain from monopolizing foreign com-
merce is thus not at variance in this regard with the commands of any foreign na-
tion.... [G]iven these alleged facts, there appears to be no reason why Congoleum
should not be held accountable in the courts of the United States for monopolizing trade
with foreign nations.
Id.
267. 595 F.2d at 1303. The remedy in Dominicus was identical. See notes 211, 263 supra.
268. 4nilrust Guide, supra note 13, at 5-6.
269. See notes 243-67 supra and accompanying text.
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States commitment to a free and open market approach to world trade.
Since Alcoa, both foreign and American firms have been notified that
anticompetitive conduct, which intentionally affects American com-
merce, is subject to United States jurisdiction. Thus, the exercise of
jurisdiction in a fraudulent patent procurement and enforcement case
is neither an unfair nor unreasonable means to accomplish the goals of
the antitrust laws in international as well as domestic trade situations.
A fraudulently obtained patent may be intrinsic to a monopolization or
attempt to monopolize scheme that may harm consumers and competi-
tors absent protection by the United States antitrust laws.270
While patents are capable of being used to create powerful and self-
perpetuating monopolies capable of being exploited to the extent that
the cost of the monopoly to the economy outweighs its benefit, it is
equally possible to'conceive of circumstances in which patent monopo-
lies benefit the economy as a whole. The consumer gains and competi-
tion is encouraged when an important invention is granted a valid
patent. Both are losers when market power is used to create or sustain
a monopoly of an invention that would have been introduced by others
in the absence of the fraudulently obtained patent.
270. One commentator noted:
Prevention of fraudulent acquisition of patent rights may be more important under
United States law than under foreign law, because once the right is established we gener-
ally do not police profits, and we generally do not require liesing ... . Since we do
neither of those things, and thus essentially allow a monopoly return to the inventor of a
product of commercial significance, it becomes very important to determine whether the
patent was valid in the first place. Because of this, we have additional engraftings on the
element of validity. One enlargement. . . is the doctrine that fraudulently obtaining a
patent is an antitrust violation-a monopolization or an attempt to monopolize.
See Davidow, United States Antitrust Laws and International Transfers of Technology-The Gov-
ernment View, 43 FORDHSm L. REv. 733, 735-36 (1975).
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